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Abstract 
This paper aims to contribute to the longstanding technology-push vs. demand-pull debate and to the 
literature on renewable energy policy assessment. We argue that in addition to the traditional push–pull 
dichotomy, the drivers of technological change must be differentiated by whether they are exogenous or 
endogenous to the economic system and must be assessed with respect to their contribution to both the 
creation and the diffusion of innovation. We apply this perspective to study innovation in the renewable 
energy (RE) industry in 15 European Union countries from 1990 to 2012. Using different panel data 
estimators, we find that public R&D investments, policies supporting RE and per capita income all have a 
positive effect on either innovation creation or diffusion, whereas the variability of policy support has a 
negative impact on diffusion. However, impacts are heterogeneous and differ depending on the 
innovation dimension considered.  Most importantly, we find that economic growth is a stronger driver of 
RE diffusion than technology-push or exogenous demand-pull mechanisms, whereas it is relatively 
ineffective at stimulating innovation creation. The effect of economic growth on RE diffusion exhibits a 
nonlinear, U-shaped pattern that resonates with the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. RE 
penetration remains negligible at low levels of growth whereas it increases sharply only after income per 
capita has reached a given threshold. This effect has both a direct cause (with increased affluence demand 
for environmental quality rises) and an indirect cause (with increased affluence expensive RE policies 
become more affordable and get implemented more extensively). Our findings have implications for 
policy making. They suggest that for RE diffusion to increase, innovation policies should be carefully 
balanced. Government action should be directed not only at shielding renewables from competition with 
fossil fuel technologies, but also at stimulating aggregated demand and economic growth.  
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1. Introduction 
The debate about technology-push and demand-pull mechanisms in supporting innovation has dominated 
the academic arena for at least two decades and continues to attract the interest of economists, 
management scholars, and industry practitioners alike (Di Stefano et al., 2012). The academic literature 
has dedicated a considerable amount of attention to studying the relative contribution of these 
mechanisms to technological progress, alternatively championing one view or the other or arguing that for 
innovation to occur both push and pull must exist simultaneously (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; 
Johnstone et al., 2010; Zachmann et al., 2014). Besides its relevance for the corporate world, the 
dichotomy between push and pull has important policy making implications (Rennings, 2000), 
particularly when government action aims to stimulate technologies that produce environmental benefits, 
such as renewable energies (Del Rio Gonzàlez, 2009).  
However, despite the burgeoning literature on the topic, several important aspects of this debate 
remain unclear, especially since when it was reignited by the need to support low carbon technologies. 
Firstly, the literature that examined the impact of innovation support mechanisms addressed different 
outcomes of the innovation process separately. An important stream of research focused on the impact of 
support mechanisms on innovation creation, typically looking at knowledge exploration activities that 
result in new patents (e.g. Hoppman et al., 2013; Nemet, 2009). A parallel stream, particularly common in 
the field of energy policy assessment, focused instead on innovation diffusion, examining the impact of 
various support instruments on the deployment technologies that are already commercially available (i.e. 
it focused on exploitation activities) (e.g. Jäger-Waldau, 2007; Marques and Fuinhas, 2012). Although 
distinct, these two facets of the innovation process are also related and should ideally be examined jointly. 
In the case of renewable energies, for instance, technological innovations produce environmental benefits 
(i.e. CO2 emissions reduction) only if they are actually adopted by end users. 
Second, research has somehow neglected the question of whether mechanisms to support 
innovation are more effective when they are exogenously induced (e.g. through the deployment of 
dedicated public policies) or when they emerge spontaneously as a result of endogenous changes in the 
economic system (e.g. as a result of economic growth). The distinction is particularly relevant for 
demand-pull mechanisms. Such mechanisms have often been studied in the context of public policies that 
exogenously create demand for environmental technologies. Conversely, they have seldom been 
examined in relation to endogenous drivers of innovation such as economic growth. Thus, several aspects 
of the relationship between exogenous and endogenous drivers of innovation remain poorly understood. 
For instance, it is still unclear whether economic growth stimulates innovation directly or only indirectly 
by creating the necessary conditions for the deployment of exogenous policies. 
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This dichotomy between technology-push and demand-pull, between exogenous and endogenous 
drivers of innovation and between innovation creation and innovation diffusion assumes particular 
relevance for renewable energy (RE) sources.  Despite the environmental and social benefits these 
technologies can generate (IEA, 2011; IPCC 2011), their diffusion remains below the level deemed 
necessary to curb CO2 emissions (IEA, 2013). Thus the question of whether and how public policies can 
foster technological progress and accelerate the market diffusion of renewables assumes particular 
relevance (Mowery et al., 2010). Advanced economies such as the United States (US) and the European 
Union (EU) have deployed a range of dedicated policies supporting renewables
5
, either by directly 
funding R&D to foster technological breakthroughs or by implementing demand-pull policies that create 
niche markets where RE sources are shielded from direct competition with fossil fuel technologies (IEA, 
2011). The heterogeneity of these policies somewhat reflects the polarization that the push-pull and the 
exploration-exploitation debates have assumed in academic circles. Their mixed results also reflect a 
research gap, which is symptomatic of an incomplete understanding of the effect of the mechanisms 
supporting innovation creation and diffusion, at least in the renewable energy context.  
To address this research gap, in this paper we analyze in a comprehensive fashion the relative 
contribution of three mechanisms supporting both the development and the diffusion of innovations in the 
renewable energy sector: public R&D investments (i.e. a pure technology-push mechanism), renewable 
energy support policies (i.e. an exogenous demand-pull mechanism), and economic growth (i.e. an 
endogenous demand-pull mechanism). Contrary to most of the extant literature that examined the two 
dimensions separately, we analyze the impact of these mechanisms on both innovation creation and 
innovation diffusion (i.e. on both exploration and exploitation activities). Furthermore, we also clarify the 
complex nexus between economic growth, public policies, and RE deployment, unveiling the cause 
effect-relationship between endogenous and exogenous drivers of innovation. Using data on the RE 
industry in 15 European countries from 1990 to 2012, we apply panel data models to estimate the impact 
of these support mechanisms on RE patents (a measure of innovation creation reflecting exploration) and 
the share of RE in the total electricity mix (a measure of innovation diffusion reflecting exploitation).  
 The analysis generates several interesting results and provides further empirical support to the 
idea that innovation policies should be carefully balanced.  First, we note that all of the support 
mechanisms analyzed (endogenous, exogenous, technology-push, and demand-pull) have a positive effect 
on either innovation creation or diffusion (or both). This is consistent with previous research arguing that 
the effectiveness of RE policy support is maximized when different instruments are deployed together 
(Johnstone et al., 2010; Grubb et al. 2014; Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2014). However, impacts are not 
                                                             
5 According to REN21 (2010), the number of countries with some kind of RE target and/or deployment policy almost doubled 
from an estimated 55 in early 2005 to more than 100 in early 2010. Most RE policies are directed to the electricity sector.  
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homogeneous across different mechanisms and also differ depending on the innovation dimension 
considered (creation vs. diffusion). Technology-push mechanisms have a stronger and more immediate 
impact on innovation creation than diffusion (the impact on diffusion becomes visible only a few years 
after R&D investments are deployed), signalling that public R&D expenditures may be needed to 
facilitate technological breakthroughs, but they are less effective in supporting short term RE deployment. 
Exogenous demand-pull policies also have a stronger positive impact on innovation creation than 
diffusion. However, their contribution becomes less important after controlling for economic growth. We 
also find that the variability of support mechanisms has a negative impact on innovation diffusion but not 
on innovation creation (i.e. it hurts exploitation but not exploration).  
Second, our results indicate that economic growth is a much stronger driver of innovation 
diffusion than technology-push or exogenous policy-driven demand-pull mechanisms, whereas it is 
relatively ineffective at stimulating innovation creation. Most importantly, we note that the contribution 
of economic growth to renewable energy diffusion becomes important only beyond a minimum level of 
affluence. We thus argue for the existence of a RE version of the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995), and we predict a convex-increasing relationship between income per 
capita and RE share: demand for environmentally friendly energy technologies starts emerging only after 
the population has reached a minimum level of wealth. However, such demand is satisfied through the 
exploitation of commercially available technologies and it does not produce any significant effect on the 
exploration of new technologies. The paper further clarifies this complex nexus between economic 
growth, RE support policies and renewable energy deployment. Although it suggests that economic 
growth has both a direct and an indirect effect on RE diffusion, through its impact on RE policies, it also 
indicates that the direct effect is largely predominant over the indirect effect (80% vs 20%).  
Finally, we also note that both the direction and the magnitude of the estimated impacts are 
dependent on the choice of the correct panel data estimator, which must take into account both cross-
sectional dependence (CSD) and nonstationarity dimensions of the underlying data generating process.  
Besides contributing to the innovation management literature, this paper complements and 
extends recent studies that examined the impact of renewable energy policies. By focusing on both 
exploration and exploitation mechanisms, and by explicitly taking into account the role of economic 
growth our study provides a more comprehensive assessments of the different drivers of innovation in the 
RE sector and it further clarifies how such drivers may contribute to the development of renewables.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. In 
session 3 we derive testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the econometric methods used to 
estimate the empirical models. Section 5 and section 6 present and discuss the main empirical results. 
Section 7 concludes the paper. Additional methodological details are reported in the Appendix. 
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2. Literature review 
Our work is related to two related streams of literature: the literature on the mechanisms to 
support innovation and the literature on environmental policy and renewable energy policy assessment.  
 
A taxonomy of innovation support mechanisms 
The question of how best to support innovation enjoys a long history in the management 
literature. For the purposes of this paper, innovation support mechanisms can be classified based on the 
type of process they activate (technology-push vs. demand-pull), their locus (exogenous vs. endogenous), 
and they can be examined with respect to the innovation outcome they produce (creation of innovations 
vs. diffusion of innovations). Although related, the literature has mostly addressed these aspects 
independently of one another and has not yet reached a consensus over which mechanism is most 
effective in supporting innovation. 
The technology-push demand-pull dichotomy is probably the one most widely studied. Although 
more recent contributions recognized they are both necessary to support innovation (Johnstone et al., 
2010; Zachmann et al., 2014), the two mechanisms were initially conceptualized as mutually exclusive. 
At the core of the technology-push argument is the idea that the rate and direction of innovation is 
triggered by the supply side, i.e., by advances in science and technology supported by research and 
development (R&D) investments (Meyers and Marquis, 1969; Dosi, 1982). By contrast, the demand-pull 
hypothesis argued that technological change is induced by anticipated changes in market demand, which 
incentivize research in new directions (Schmookler, 1966).  
Both perspectives have been used to justify the implementation of public policies that 
exogenously support innovation. The technology-push view was used to justify the deployment of supply-
side policies to foster breakthroughs in certain strategic industries. By the same token, the demand-pull 
perspective is the theoretical backbone for exogenous policies that enhance the relative competitiveness 
of emerging technologies vis-à-vis established alternatives in certain niche markets. In such niches, new 
technologies can be shielded from direct competition (e.g. Kemp et al., 1998) and can therefore more 
easily attract investments and benefit from economies of scale (Nemet, 2009).  
The effectiveness of supply-side technology-push policies has been recently questioned, after 
noticing that when controlling for the interaction with other policies, supply-side subsidies cease to be as 
effective as reported in previous studies (Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2014). The use of exogenous mechanisms 
to stimulate demand was also criticized, and for various reasons, reflecting a contrast between exogenous 
and endogenous drivers of innovation. First, exogenous policies may not be well suited to fostering 
breakthrough innovations because they lead firms to prefer exploitation over exploration (Nemet, 2009). 
This eventually generates lock-in effects and reduces technological diversity in the industry (Malerba, 
6 
 
2009). Since “technological search under a lock-in situation becomes highly localized and incremental in 
nature, this precludes the development and diffusion of radically different, economically or ecologically 
superior technological alternatives” (Hoppmann et al., 2013: p. 990). In essence, exogenous policies may 
favor incremental innovations, but they may not necessarily support the exploration of technological 
breakthrough. Second, to be effective, deployment policies need to remain stable over many years; as 
niche markets that rely heavily on direct subsidies do not produce enough incentives to innovate. Once 
subsidies are removed, new technologies face even greater gaps with their competitors and may be 
abandoned. Finally, the implementation of deployment policies often requires governments to pick 
winners in advance (i.e., at a very early development stage). This increases the risk that they “bet on the 
wrong horse”, creating protected market niches for technologies that, although initially promising, may 
eventually prove inferior in the long run (Sartorius, 2005; van den Heuvel and van den Bergh, 2009).  
An alternative view argues that demand-pull mechanisms are most effective when they are 
endogenously driven, i.e., when investments in emerging technologies are triggered by endogenous 
changes in aggregated demand. When the economy grows, new unsatisfied needs emerge and attract 
investments independently of support policies, eventually triggering a technology-push cycle. Firms use 
expected demand to orient their manufacturing efforts. In turn, experience and learning-by-doing, which 
cannot completely be substituted for by R&D investments, generate improvements and increase the 
competiveness of new technologies (see Nemet (2009) for a review of the main arguments supporting this 
perspective). Unsurprisingly, advocates of this perspective challenge the effectiveness of exogenous 
mechanisms and contend that policies to promote technological change should be directed at stimulating 
economic growth rather than at shielding innovation from competition. Such strategies also eliminate the 
problem of picking winners: when innovation is triggered by endogenous growth, markets will naturally 
select the technologies best suited to respond to expected needs, guiding innovation trajectories to the 
most appropriate targets (Dosi, 1982).  
 
Innovation support mechanisms for environmental technologies  
The debate over these alternative mechanisms to support innovation was reignited by the recent 
attempts to promote technologies that produce environmental or social benefits, such as renewable 
energies. The dichotomy between exogenous and endogenous mechanisms has especially been the focus 
of the broader stream of research that addresses the link between environmental policy and technological 
change
6
. The crux of this theoretical debate is whether environmentally-friendly innovation is more 
effectively induced by market-based policies, such as tradable permits or by command-and-control 
                                                             
6 See Popp et al. (2010) for an excellent survey of the literature and Baumol and Oates (1998) for a rigorous and comprehensive 
analysis of the economic theory of environmental policy. 
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policies such as performance- or technology-based standards. The market-based policy argument 
maintains that, whereas the command-and-control regulations allow relatively little flexibility in the 
choice of technologies or inputs to the production process, market-based instruments can provide 
powerful incentives for companies to adopt cheaper and better pollution-control technologies (Hahn and 
Stavins, 1992; Popp et al., 2010). Conversely, in a seminal contribution, Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
showed how in practice some of the loss of competitiveness related to command-and-control 
environmental regulations is compensated by an increase in innovation driven by the policy itself, an 
argument that found further support in recent empirical work on policy-induced environmental 
innovations (Mazzanti et al., 2014) and their consequences for export flow dynamics (Costantini and 
Mazzanti, 2012). The debate is further enriched by the fact that different policies affect different 
innovation dimensions. In the US, innovation became cheaper and more effective in reducing sulfur 
dioxide emissions after tradable permits were introduced in 1990. However, the level of innovation, 
measured by the number of successful patent applications, was actually higher in the command-and-
control environment that preceded the introduction of market-based mechanisms (Popp et al., 2003).  
A subset of the above research focused explicitly on mechanisms to support renewable energy 
technologies. When applied to the RE sector, the push-pull exogenous-endogenous conceptualization 
produces the taxonomy shown in Figure 1.
7
 Even within the more limited domain of energy technologies, 
there is no consensus (yet) on which of the two mechanisms (push vs. pull) and which of the two loci 
(endogenous vs exogenous) are the most effective to support innovation.  
------------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
In the RE context, technology-push and demand-pull mechanisms have been primarily studied in 
relation to exogenous policies that support low-carbon innovations8. Following the large number of 
different RE policies deployed in several countries over the past decade, an emerging body of empirical 
literature has started examining the effectiveness of these policies and the support mechanisms underlying 
them (Jäger-Waldau, 2007; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008; Masini and Menichetti, 2012; Marques and 
Fuinhas, 2012) as well as the determinants of RE policy choices (Schaffer and Bernauer, 2014). This 
literature is too vast to be summarized here (see Table 1 for a succinct taxonomy)
9
. Suffice here to note 
that it produced mixed findings, suggesting that the relationship between RE support policies and RE 
                                                             
7 In this paper, we are especially interested in analyzing the impact of innovation mechanisms that can be activated, either 
directly or indirectly, through policy instruments. Thus we will not discuss endogenous technology-push mechanisms (i.e. 
corporate R&D investments), as they are clearly outside the scope of our study. 
8 Interestingly, the push and pull mechanisms discussed in the innovation management literature resonate well with two of the 
environmental policy pillars proposed by Grubb et al. (2014): pricing and markets (a demand-pull mechanism) and strategic 
investments in technological innovation (a clear push mechanism aimed at supporting R&D). 
9 See Basher et al. (2015) for a more comprehensive review of this literature. 
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diffusion remains, at best, elusive and heavily context-dependent. For instance, Johnstone et al. (2010) 
find that quantity-based policies (e.g. TGCs) favored the development of wind energy, whereas direct 
investment incentives such as FITs are deemed effective in supporting innovation in solar and waste-to-
energy technologies. Conversely, Borghesi et al. (2015) provided less clear-cut evidence on the effects of 
environmental policies to promote the development of cleaner energy technologies. While confirming the 
importance of well-designed, long-term and time-consistent policies, they also noted that the impact of 
certain schemes such as the EU-ETS is dependent on several sector-specific factors.   
The impact of innovation support mechanisms has also been examined with respect to cross-
border and cross-sector spillovers, i.e. whether policy implemented in a given jurisdiction or aimed at 
promoting the growth of a specific industry produce second-order effects in other jurisdictions or sectors. 
Peters et al. (2012) note that while both domestic and foreign demand-pull policies trigger innovation in a 
given country, there is no evidence that domestic technology-push policies foster innovative output 
outside of national borders (an argument often used by the opponents of such policies). They also detect 
no indication that market growth induced by domestic demand-pull policies leads to more national 
innovative output than market growth induced by foreign demand-pull policies. Consequently, they 
suggest that demand-pull policies create significant country-level innovation spillovers, which could 
eliminate incentives to national policymakers for stimulating domestic market creation. The related 
problem of cross-sector spillovers was addressed by Corradini et al. (2014), which found that policies that 
oblige companies to abate emissions in a given sector may trigger R&D investments in other sectors, 
thereby creating joint private and public benefits. 
Though distinguished, most of these studies addressed only certain support mechanisms and 
examined their impact on one specific outcome of the innovation process (either creation or diffusion). 
For instance, recent studies that focused on RE capacity deployment (e.g. Polzin et al., 2015) neglected 
the dichotomy between exploration and exploitation and disregarded the role of other important elements 
such as economic growth and the impact of policy variability. By the same token, other studies such as 
Nesta et al. (2014) that examined the impact of regulation and market structure on innovation creation 
(i.e. the generation of RE patents) did not consider the consequences of these factors for RE capacity 
deployment. Similarly, other recent contributions that examined both innovation creation and diffusion, 
limited their analysis to some specific RE technologies only. For instance, focusing on exogenous support 
mechanisms in the biofuels sector, Constantini et al. (2015) show that both demand-pull and technology-
push factors are important drivers of innovation. They also note that technology exploitation activities in 
first generation technologies are mainly driven by demand pull policies (both quantity and price-based), 
whereas technology exploration efforts in advanced generation biofuels react positively to both price-
based demand-pull incentives and technology-push policies.  
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Our study also complements a related subset of this literature that has explicitly looked at the 
problem of policy variability. Although the idea that discontinuities in policy support may discourage RE 
deployment has already attracted the attention of energy policy scholars, the question has so far been 
addressed using case-based approaches, for specific technologies such as biomass and mostly from the 
point of view of RE investors (White et al., 2013). We complement this work by examining the impact of 
policy variability on both innovation creation and diffusion, and for the whole range of RE technologies. 
In the renewable energy context, endogenous mechanisms to support innovation have mostly 
been studied indirectly, by the literature that examined the relationship between economic growth and 
emissions per capita (the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis). Advocates of the 
endogenous demand-pull perspective challenge the effectiveness of exogenous RE support policies and 
question their economic justification, mostly on the ground that RE subsidies lead to an inefficient 
allocation of resources and, in the long run, reduce the competitiveness of the renewables industry rather 
than accelerating it (Sandén, 2005). Conversely, the endogenous view argues that RE diffusion is best 
induced by economic growth, because during the early stages of growth, investments are inevitably 
attracted by the technologies that cost the least (and are possibly the least environmentally friendly). It is 
only after income per capita has reached a given threshold that investments are redirected to less polluting 
but more expensive technologies. This perspective resonates well with the Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) hypothesis, positing an inverted U-shaped relationship between economic growth and emissions 
per capita (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). The EKC hypothesis implies that government support should 
be directed at stimulating aggregated demand rather than at establishing niche markets. Although an 
appealing hypothesis, the effectiveness of growth in stabilizing emissions has recently been questioned. 
For instance, Musolesi and Mazzanti, (2014) found that an EKC for CO2 emissions is only visible for 
northern European countries that anticipated the Kyoto protocol and have better institutional frameworks. 
Likewise, Mazzanti and Musolesi (2013) noticed that EKC seems to be less evident than initially 
hypothesized after serial correlation and (heterogeneous) time effects have been accounted for. 
In sum, the literature is increasingly recognizing the importance of studying different innovation 
support mechanisms both in general and in the RE industry. However, most studies that examined the 
impact of these mechanisms in the RE sector generated mixed findings, suggesting that the results are 
context-dependent and are heavily influenced by model specification choices. Furthermore, the majority 
of the studies that examined the impact of different instruments supporting RE deployment have studied 
them independently of one another. More critically, although some authors have explicitly recognized 
complementarities between exogenous push and pull mechanisms, they have typically neglected the role 
of endogenous mechanisms. The few papers have started investigating the contribution of the endogenous 
drivers of RE diffusion and the impact of policy variability have mostly adopted a case-based approach 
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(Hoppmann et al., 2013; 2014). By the same token, scholars have not simultaneously examined the effect 
of these different support mechanisms on both innovation creation and diffusion. Thus, a rigorous and 
systematic empirical analysis of these effects is still lacking.  
To address this gap, in the remainder of this paper, we examine the joint effect of three 
interrelated drivers of technological change in the energy sector, looking at their impact on both 
innovation creation and innovation diffusion. Our work contributes to the above literature by providing a 
more comprehensive and holistic analysis of the various drivers of innovation in the RE sector, which 
considers multiple technologies in several countries and for different innovation outcomes.   
------------------------------------ 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
3. Hypotheses 
Exogenous technology-push mechanisms 
There are a host of welfare-centric arguments emphasizing the merit of exogenous technology-push 
policies, such as public R&D spending as a driver of technological change in the clean energy sector. In 
short, government funding plays a pivotal role in the innovation process because of the importance of 
diffuse externalities. Since knowledge spillovers are pervasive, it is hard for any single firm to appropriate 
all the returns to innovations (Stiglitz, 2014). Innovation management researchers have also argued that 
technology-push instruments have a positive effect on innovation because they help firms broaden their 
search strategies and pursue unconventional technological trajectories (Dosi, 1988). Within the RE 
innovation literature, a few studies have documented a positive influence of domestic technology-push 
policies in advancing RE technologies. Watanabe et al. (2000) found that public R&D funding helped to 
achieve significant innovation in the Japanese photovoltaic (PV) industry, resulting in a dramatic decrease 
in solar cell prices between 1974 and 1994 (from $350/W to $5.4/W, in 2005 prices). Klaassen et al. 
(2005) and Söderholm and Klaassen (2007) also detected the positive effect of public R&D funding on 
wind energy technology innovation in four European countries (Denmark, Germany, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom (UK)). Johnstone et al. (2010) found that technology-specific R&D subsidies had a 
significant and sizable effect on innovation (measured by patent data) in wind, solar, and geothermal RE. 
Braun et al. (2010) also found that public R&D funding stimulates innovation in RE technologies, 
particularly for solar technologies. Veugelers (2012) presented firm-level evidence confirming that firms 
introducing clean innovations are responsive to eco-policy interventions. In line with the extant literature, 
we maintain that technology-push policies exert a positive impact on both innovation creation and 
innovation diffusion. Therefore, we use the following propositions as our default hypotheses: 
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H1a: In the RE sector, exogenous technology-push policies have a direct and positive impact on the rate 
of innovation creation. 
H1b: In the RE sector, exogenous technology-push policies have a direct and positive impact on the rate 
of innovation diffusion. 
 
Exogenous demand-pull mechanisms 
In contrast to technology-push policies, which offer incentives for firms to innovate, demand-pull (or 
market-pull) policies aim to increase the adoption and diffusion of renewables by creating demand for RE 
technologies. Most of the studies that have examined demand-pull mechanisms focused on exogenous 
instruments, i.e. on government support measures aimed at creating niche markets where RE sources are 
shielded from direct competition with fossil fuel technologies. Examples of such measures include 
quantity-driven policies like quotas and price-driven policies like feed-in tariffs (FITs), fiscal incentives, 
such as tax credits and rebates, and public finance policies such as low-interest loans. Numerous 
empirical studies have shown that RE support policies have been effective and efficient
10
 in promoting 
renewable generation (Meyer, 2003; Jäger-Waldau, 2007; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008; IEA, 2008; 
REN21, 2009; Marques and Fuinhas, 2012). In addition to their contribution to increasing the diffusion 
rate of RE, market-pull policies have also been a catalyst for innovation in RE technologies (Hoppmann 
et al., 2013). Although empirical studies in support of this hypothesis is scarce for RE, it has been argued 
that both price-based measures (e.g. FITs) and quantity-based measures (e.g. TGCs) are effective in 
inducing innovation for RE sources (Johnstone et al., 2010), though at different stages of technology 
development (IEA 2004, 2011). We expect exogenous demand-pull policies such as feed-in-tariffs to 
have an effect on both innovation diffusion and innovation creation. In the short run, the market niches 
created by these policies favor the diffusion of technological innovations that are already commercially 
available. In the long run, providing policies are stable enough, they should also induce firms to undertake 
new R&D investments and eventually stimulate the creation of innovation. Thus, we propose to formally 
examine the following hypotheses: 
H2a: In the RE sector, exogenous demand-pull policies have a direct and positive impact on the rate of 
innovation creation. 
H2b: In the RE sector, exogenous demand-pull policies have a direct and positive impact on the rate of 
innovation diffusion.  
                                                             
10 Policy effectiveness refers to a policy’s ability to achieve its stated objectives (e.g. attaining a certain RE target). Efficiency 
refers to a policy’s ability to do so at minimum cost. 
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Demand-oriented deployment policies have not been exempted from criticism, however. First, a 
number of theoretical and empirical papers have come to a strong consensus that to be effective in 
enhancing demand for new RE technologies demand-pull measures must be complemented by 
technology-push instruments and public R&D investments (e.g. Grubb, 2004; Fischer, 2008; Bürer and 
Wüstenhagen, 2009; Johnstone et al., 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2012; Zachmann et al., 2014). The logic is 
simple. By using the public R&D during the early phase of the innovation chain and then deploying 
demand-pull policies in later stages (when the technology is closer to market commercialization), the 
adoption and diffusion of new RE technologies is easier to accelerate. Together, R&D and deployment 
policies create a positive feedback cycle (Watanabe et al., 2000), where the resulting benefits in turn 
create positive feedback to the policy cycle (IPCC 2011). Another rationale for overlapping policies is to 
prevent lock-in of dominant technologies by helping the renewable sector on a lower-cost pathway 
(Fischer and Preonas, 2010). 
The effectiveness of demand-oriented policies can also be challenged on the ground that these 
instruments may discourage exploration, inducing the RE industry to pursue incremental innovation 
trajectories (Menanteau, 2000; Sartorius, 2005; Nemet, 2009; van den Heuvel and van den Bergh, 2009).  
Other studies also emphasized that for deployment policies to be effective, they must be applied 
consistently and over a sufficiently long time horizon (Masini and Menichetti, 2012). Therefore, as 
exogenous policies are subject to political discretion (Hoffmann et al., 2008) and typically erratic, their 
long-term effectiveness can indeed be questioned. Lack of consistency in policies becomes a 
noneconomic barrier, which enhances the perceived risk of developing and financing RE installations (de 
Jager and Rathmann, 2008). We aim to contribute to this debate by testing the following hypotheses: 
H3a: In the RE sector, the variability of exogenous demand-pull policies has a direct and negative impact 
on the rate of innovation creation. 
H3b: In the RE sector, the variability of exogenous demand-pull policies has a direct and negative impact 
on the rate of innovation diffusion. 
 
Endogenous demand-pull mechanisms 
Although the literature has extensively studied exogenous instruments for supporting the RE industry, it 
has somewhat neglected endogenous drivers such as economic growth. We posit that in the RE industry 
economic growth can accelerate both innovation creation and diffusion either directly or indirectly. 
13 
 
First, economic growth can exert an indirect effect on innovation
11
. The level of economic 
affluence of a country induces the population to demand greater environmental quality because of its 
effects on quality of life and wellbeing (Bayer and Urpelainen 2013).
12
 Such demand may create 
“institutional pressure” and induce policy makers to implement legislation that makes renewables more 
competitive vis-a-vis fossil fuel technologies, thereby creating new market opportunities. However, since 
environmental policies are typically costly, they are more likely to be implemented on a large scale in rich 
countries. In turn, as maintained by the hypotheses 1 and 2, exogenous policies should have a positive 
effect on both innovation creation and diffusion. Therefore, we propose: 
H4a: In the RE sector, economic growth affects the rate of innovation creation indirectly, by favoring the 
deployment of RE support policies.  
H4b: In the RE sector, economic growth affects the rate of innovation diffusion indirectly, by favoring the 
deployment of RE support policies.  
 
Second, economic growth can also have a direct effect on innovation creation. Irrespective of any 
policy support firms may respond to the anticipated demand for higher environmental quality by 
undertaking long-term investments in RE. As firms usually prefer equity over debt for funding R&D 
activities with uncertain outcomes (Hall and Lerner, 2009; Rosenberg, 1990), income is a strong driver of 
exploration activities (Hall, 1988). The effect is particularly important for firms exploiting relatively 
mature RE technologies, such as crystalline silicon photovoltaics, for which “[t]he resources available for 
R&D are strongly linked to existing cash flows” (Hoppmann et al., 2013, p. 995). One may object, 
though, that exogenous demand-oriented policies would produce a similar income effect. However, as 
exogenous policies are subject to political discretion (Hoffmann et al., 2008), they may generate 
additional uncertainty about future profits and thus discourage exploration and innovation (Nemet, 2009).  
Economic growth can also stimulate innovation diffusion directly. Even if renewables remain a 
more expensive option, they may still be preferred over fossil fuel technologies because consumers with 
greater budget surpluses are willing to pay higher prices for products and services with greater 
environmental quality. This argument finds ample evidence in the literature on EKC, which describes the 
relationship between prosperity and the environmental degradation (e.g. per capita pollution) as an 
inverted U-shape. Simply put, the EKC hypothesis states that at the early stages of growth the 
environment tends to suffer but beyond some level of income per capita, pollution reduces. Grossman and 
                                                             
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention. 
12 The argument that the demand for environmental quality rises with income is typically advanced under the 
“prosperity/affluence hypothesis” in environmental economics (e.g. Baumol and Oates 1979; Field 1994). 
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Krueger (1995) first provided statistical evidence for the existence of an EKC relationship for two 
indicators of environmental quality: sulfur dioxide and dark matter (smoke). Stern (2014), among others, 
provides a typical survey of recent empirical work on the EKC relationship. Although recent 
contributions (Mazzanti and Musolesi, 2013; Musolesi and Mazzanti, 2014) challenge the validity of the 
EKC hypothesis, we argue this concept can be applied to the case of RE. In the same vein, (per capita) 
pollution falls once an income threshold is reached: higher income induces the population to demand a 
higher RE share (as a percentage of overall energy consumption) as an indicator of environmental 
quality.
13
 Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H5a: In the RE sector, the rate of innovation creation increases more than proportionally with an 
increase of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (i.e. there is a U-shaped relationship between GDP 
per capita and innovation creation).  
H5b: In the RE sector, the rate of innovation diffusion increases more than proportionally with an 
increase of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (i.e. there is a U-shaped relationship between GDP 
per capita and innovation diffusion). 
 
4. Data and model specification 
4.1. Data 
The impact of the different drivers of innovation creation and diffusion in the RE industry was tested 
using data from 15 EU countries over the period 1990–2012. The 15 countries include Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the UK, henceforth referred to as the EU-15 countries. The main reason for focusing 
on these EU-15 countries owes to their higher renewable progress compared to new member states. 
Besides, this particular group of EU-15 countries is often considered in the various policy assessments of 
renewable development in the EU (e.g. Ragwitz et al., 2007). The start date was chosen to reflect the 
rapid deployment of RE sources after 1990 as a result of the energy policies adopted by the EU; the 
endpoint was chosen based on the availability of data when we started this research.  
Our first dependent variable must reflect innovation creation in the renewable energy sector. We 
use patent data, a popular measure of innovation creation. Following Johnstone et al. (2010), we use 
patents applied to the European Patent Office (EPO). This is consistent with our sample, which represents 
predominantly European countries. In line with Costantini et al. (2015), we do not rely on patents applied 
to USPTO because US firms have a higher propensity to apply to USPTO than to other international 
                                                             
13 This hypothesis has already been supported by some evidence in Menegaki and Tsagarakis (2015). 
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offices. Our dependent variable is thus defined as a pure patent count data based on the number of patents 
applied to EPO in the field of renewable energy. The data were extracted from the OECD’s Directorate 
for Science, Technology and Industry patent database.   
Our second dependent variable, which accounts for the diffusion of RES, is the ratio of renewable 
to total electricity. This metric is commonly used to monitor the progress of RE development in the EU. 
Furthermore, it is particularly appropriate for our study because, unlike other indicators such as added 
capacity, RE share depends on the stock of renewable generation capacity at time t, not on the new 
capacity installed (i.e. RE flow). Given the long operating life of power generation units (25 years or 
higher), this stock is influenced by all the policies implemented up to time t regardless of whether any 
policies have been discontinued or not. RE share data were collected from the World Energy Balance 
dataset, published by the International Energy Agency (IEA). The RE sources include geothermal, solar 
photovoltaics, solar thermal, tidal/ocean/wave energy, wind power, municipal waste, primary solid 
biofuels, biogases, biogasoline, biodiesels, other liquid biofuels, nonspecified primary biofuels and waste, 
and charcoal. Following the tradition of previous empirical work, we have excluded hydropower from the 
definition of RE. This choice is also consistent with our goal of testing the impact of different policy 
instruments on technological change, because large hydropower plants are mature technologies and 
cannot be used as a proxy for innovation in the energy industry. 
Exogenous technology-push instruments were measured by calculating the public R&D spending 
in the RE industry (excluding hydropower) relative to total public R&D spending in the electricity 
generation industry. The RE research, development and deployment (RD&D) spending data were 
obtained from IEA’s Detailed Country RD&D Budgets. To calculate the relative contribution of RD&D, 
we used the product “total RD&D in million US dollars” (2012 prices) and the flow “renewable energy 
sources (excluding hydro)” as the numerator and “renewable plus fossil budgets” as the denominator. 
Exogenous demand-pull instruments were operationalized through a Renewable Energy Policy 
(REP) index variable. The REP index, adapted from Aguirre and Ibikunle (2014), was originally based on 
the information available in the IEA/IRENA Joint Policies and Measures Database.
14
 The REP index 
includes five policies expressed as dummies: economic instruments, policy support, regulatory 
instruments, RD&D and voluntary approaches. Note that the RD&D dummy does not reflect public 
spending in R&D for renewables, (which is accounted for by the dedicated variable discussed above). 
Instead, it accounts for demonstration projects to increase awareness (i.e. a demand-pull mechanism) and 
for special funding for collaborative research. To create a single policy index that varied over years and 
across countries, we created a series of dummy variables reflecting the adoption of each policy. Following 
Nesta et al. (2014), we constructed the REP index as the sum of all implemented policies. 
                                                             
14 Available at: http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/ (accessed 1 Dec. 2014) 
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Note that the use of RE share as a dependent variable also rationalizes the measure we use to 
construct the REP index, reflecting the existence of different policy types across countries. To see how 
the REP index is consistent with the choice of our dependent variable (i.e. RE share) consider, for 
example, in 2007, Spain implemented FIT for PV and discontinued it in 2009. Such a policy would cause 
an increase in installed PV capacity in 2007 and 2008, but not from 2009 onwards. However, the 
photovoltaic systems installed in 2007 and 2008 will continue to generate electricity in 2009 and beyond, 
thereby contributing to the RE share even after the policy has been discontinued. In other words, a RE 
policy implemented at time t* will have an impact on renewable stock from t=t* until t=t*+T, where T is 
the operating life of a power unit. Given that our data cover an interval less than T, we can assume that all 
policies implemented have continued to exert their effect throughout the whole observation period. 
To operationalize the variable assessing the variability in the level of policy support, we 
constructed a REP variance indicator as the first difference of the REP index (i.e.                   
              ). Finally, endogenous demand mechanisms were accounted for by considering economic 
growth, measured as GDP per capita (in 2005 US dollars). Data for this indicator were obtained from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicator. 
 
4.2 Model specification and econometric issues 
The research hypotheses were tested by estimating the following panel data models: 
                          , (1) 
where i=1,2,…,N and t=1,2,…,T index the cross-sectional units and time series, respectively; the 
subscript s denotes whether the dependent variable is patent counts (for RE innovation) or the share of 
RES in electricity generation (for RE diffusion). The vector 
                                                
   contains the independent variables, where 
          accounts for exogenous demand-pull policies supporting renewables and      accounts for 
policy variability. The term       is the logarithm of the contribution of RE R&D spending to the total 
RD&D budget in the fossil and renewable sectors when the dependent variable is RES’s share in 
electricity production. For the RE innovation model with patent counts as the dependent variable, we use 
R&D spending in levels (in 2012 constant prices). The terms       and        are the log of per capita 
income and income squared, respectively. The coefficients    denote country-specific effects, including 
unobserved heterogeneity. The variable   is the common linear time trend, whereas     represents random 
disturbances dependent across countries. Notice that, in line with Hypothesis 5, we expect the coefficients 
of       and        to obey        and         for all i so that the results lend support to the U-
shape relationship between RE sources and per capita income as discussed above.  
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Given the different properties of the dependent variables (patent counts vs. RE share), we use 
different estimators for the innovation creation and the innovation diffusion model. For the RE innovation 
model with patent counts as the dependent variable, the empirical model is estimated using both Poisson 
and negative binomial estimators. However, since patent data typically are over-dispersed (i.e. the 
variance exceeds the mean), the negative binomial estimator is generally preferred over the Poisson 
estimator. In both models, we allow country fixed effects to partly address the differences in patent 
quality across countries (Costantini et al., 2015).  Conversely, for the RE diffusion model, where the 
dependent variable contains a unit root (see Appendix A for further discussion), the choice of panel data 
estimators is guided by the need to incorporate the time series properties of the data (i.e. unit root, 
cointegration and cross-sectional dependence). To that end, we apply both a traditional fixed effects 
estimator (which is used widely in the applied RE literature) and a state-of-the-art methodology (i.e., the 
common correlated effect mean group estimator of Pesaran (2006)) to address nonstationarity and cross-
sectional dependence (CSD) in the data. CSD is caused by, among other factors, by cross-border 
spillovers (Corradini et al., 2014), a common phenomenon in the RE industry. See the discussion in 
Appendix A and B for further details.  
Finally, to test hypothesis 4 we conducted a mediation analysis to understand if and to what 
extent the effect of economic growth (a treatment variable) on RE diffusion (the outcome variable) is 
mediated by RE policies (a potential mediator). Following Baron and Kenny (1986), the model for RE 
diffusion (including mediator) is given as: 
                  , (2) 
the model for the mediator is: 
            , (3) 
where Y (outcome) is RE diffusion, a (treatment) is economic growth, and m is the mediator (i.e. RE 
policies). To conduct the analysis, we used the “medeff” routine by Hicks and Tingley (2011) in Stata.  
 
5. Preliminary data analysis and descriptive statistics 
Figure 2 presents linear plots for panel data for the dependent and independent variables. The variables 
are shown in the way they are entered in the regression equations (i.e. log transformed, where applicable). 
A general feature of the variables is that they all exhibit a smooth upward trend, except for RE R&D, 
which shows some volatility. Generally, energy R&D expenditure is as volatile as the energy market 
itself. The plot of the RE policy index fits the most common feature of the RE policy landscape: in the 
1990s, RE policies were in place in only a handful of countries, but they grew exponentially after 2000. 
The log of RE share depicts an interesting trend of convergence in RE sources across the EU-15 
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countries. However, the logs of real per capita GDP—widely recognized as being unit root processes—
show country variation in income among the EU-15 nations. 
------------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
Further details about these variables emerge from Table 2, which presents mean and standard 
deviation for the dependent and independent variables. For the sake of greater comparability, these 
descriptive statistics have been obtained using the original data. A few remarks are in order. Among the 
EU15 countries  in the period of our analysis most of the innovation in RE industry took place in 
Germany, which displays the highest number of patent applications in the sample (nearly 45% of total). 
Moreover, the innovation process appears to be highly concentrated too: four countries (Denmark, France, 
Germany, and the UK) account for over 70% of invention in the renewable industry in the EU15. The RE 
diffusion pattern is also worth discussing. Over the full sample, the average share of RE in most countries 
is low (5% or less), with the exception of Denmark, Finland, and Portugal. However, since 2000, the 
diffusion of RE has increased noticeably in countries such as Finland, Germany, and Spain, with a RE 
share of 10% or more. France remains an outlier, with a negligible contribution of RE to total energy (less 
than 2%). This is because nuclear energy accounts for over three-fourths of electricity production in 
France. Denmark, which has nearly zero hydroelectric resources, is really a forerunner in clean energy 
generation among the EU-15. RE sources in Denmark rely solely on wind energy and biomass, and have 
maintained an average share of 25% in the post-2000 period. Other countries in which the adoption of RE 
significantly increased in the new millennium are Austria, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden; 
with an average RE share of 7% or higher.  
------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
Income per capita ranges from $16,940 (Portugal) to $69,966 (Luxembourg), with the majority of 
the countries showing a per capita income above the $30,000 threshold. To make an individual country’s 
RE position conditional on its income level, Figure 3 depicts a matrix that maps countries according to 
two dimensions. The first dimension is the country’s position regarding renewable development relative 
to the rest of the group. Hence, a country has a lower (higher) RE share if its average level is lower 
(higher) than the median level of the EU-15 over the observation period. Similarly, the second dimension, 
which reflects a country’s economic strength, identifies a country as having lower (higher) GDP per 
capita if its average income level is lower (higher) than the median income level of the EU-15 over the 
sample period. This perspective serves as a proxy for the relative ability to deploy the necessary measures 
to foster renewable energy development. The information in Figure 3 speaks for itself. Italy, Portugal, and 
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Spain are clearly the champions in fostering the growth of nonhydro RE sources. In contrast, Belgium and 
the UK trail other nations in their effort to hit the energy targets set for 2020
15
.  
 
------------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
Turning to the share of RE RD&D spending as a percentage of the total RD&D spending in the 
fossil and renewable sectors, we find that (barring France) a large fraction of energy R&D spending in the 
EU-15 countries is devoted to RE. This is not surprising, given that these countries are a net importer of 
fossil fuels (particularly oil), so that developing alternative energy sources such as RE sources are 
considered as a national priority to improve the respective countries’ energy security position, among 
other goals. In the EU-15, Germany spends much more than the other nations on renewable R&D and has 
a large stock of R&D personnel. In terms of the share of RE in total national R&D budgets, Denmark and 
the Netherlands have the highest ratios. On the other hand, for the ratio of the share of RE R&D to GDP, 
the leading countries are Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
The average levels of the REP index also differ markedly among the EU-15, including their 
volatility (measured by the standard deviation). Although, in general, it is tempting to conclude that 
countries with a higher REP index have a greater number of policies devoted to RE sources, the limitation 
of this argument is that it ignores the associated volatility or policy uncertainty. For example, the average 
REP index in the UK is the highest, but its standard deviation is also very high (coefficient of variation 
higher than 1), which makes the UK (after Spain) very vulnerable to policy uncertainty. Within the RE 
policy arena the situation of Spain and Portugal is very fragile. In these countries, there were few and 
unstable accumulated policies (with the coefficient of variation for the REP index exceeding 1). By 
contrast, in Germany and Denmark, RE policies are numerous and are stable, compared to their EU peers. 
Finally, Figure 4 presents the distribution of the regression variables in descending order based on 
the median. The median share, represented by a line subdividing the box, is not very different between 
countries for RE share. On the other hand, with the exception of Ireland and Luxembourg, the distribution 
of per capita income is quite symmetric across the EU-15.   
------------------------------- 
Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 
                                                             
15 According to the Renewable Energy Directive, the EU countries are required to fulfil at least 20% of their total energy needs 
through renewable energy sources by 2020. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy  
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6. Discussion of results 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the estimation results for RE innovation and RE diffusion, respectively. Two 
remarks are in order. First, for the RE innovation model (where the dependent variable is represented by a 
count of patents in the renewable energy industry) we apply both Poisson and negative binominal 
estimators, incorporating fixed effects. Although the results are roughly similar, below we only discuss 
the results obtained by applying the fixed effects negative binomial model (Table 3), as it is robust to 
overdispersed count data.
16
 Likewise, for the RE diffusion model, where the dependent variable contains a 
unit root (see Appendix A for further discussion), we will discuss the results obtained by the CCEMG 
estimator, which is robust to both nonstationarity of variables and cross-sectional dependence. The 
estimates of the alternative econometric methods are available from the authors on request. 
Second, Tables 3 and 4 present results of the various nested models. This allows us to examine 
the incremental role of demand-pull and technology-push policies in spurring innovation and fostering the 
diffusion of RES. For example, column [1] in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that analyzing exogenous demand-
pull instruments without taking endogenous mechanisms into account tends to overestimate the impact of 
RE policies. Furthermore, with this nested structure, we are able to observe that the sign on each variable 
remains unaffected by the inclusion of additional regressor(s), suggesting the robustness of the results. 
While the discussion below is based on the results of the full models (column [5] in Tables 3 and 4), 
where it is necessary we will make connection between the full and nested models. The full model 
(represented by column [5]) includes a country-specific linear time trend, which may be correlated with 
both policy implementation and RE development. Specifically, a time trend is often included to capture 
the common technological trend towards lower costs in the RE industry.
17
 
------------------------------------ 
Table 2 and table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Let us now turn to the analysis of the empirical results pertaining to our main hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b consider the impact of exogenous technology-push policies. As expected, in the 
innovation model, the coefficient for R&D spending is positive and significant at the 1% level (see 
column [5] in Table 3), supporting the hypothesis that exogenous technology-push mechanisms foster 
innovation in the renewable industry. This is consistent with previous empirical studies that demonstrated 
the positive effect of technology-push R&D spending on innovation in the RE sector (see, e.g. Watanabe 
et al., 2000; Klaasen et al., 2005; Johnstone et al., 2010). Results also support hypothesis 1b. Notice that 
                                                             
16 The regression results remain broadly the same across different specifications with bootstrapped standard errors. 
17 Braun et al. (2010) argues that time trends “are important for capturing general changes in the propensity to patent and strategic 
patenting behaviour across countries” (p. 12). 
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public R&D spending has an even larger effect on RE diffusion than on innovation (the estimated 
coefficient is 0.21 for diffusion versus 0.002 for innovation). However, while R&D spending has a rather 
instantaneous effect on innovation, its impact on diffusion becomes visible only after a non-negligible 
time lag (the effect is maximized for a five-year lag). This is consistent with previous findings
18
: 
innovation produced by R&D efforts needs an initial “gestation” period before becoming commercially 
available and, therefore, being able to exert an impact on technology diffusion. Thus, the relationship 
between R&D spending and RE diffusion is not direct. Instead, the impact comes from higher innovations 
in the form of cost reduction and the resulting learning activities, which in turn should lead to increased 
market penetration of RE technologies.  
In Hypothesis 2a and 2b, we argue that exogenous demand-pull policies have a positive impact on 
both innovation and diffusion in the RE industry. The empirical results clearly support these hypotheses, 
as the estimated coefficient for the REP index is positive and statistically significant in both models (see 
column [5] in Tables 3 and 4). This result echoes the findings of various studies arguing that government 
policies have played a crucial role in accelerating the deployment of RE sources (see IPCC 2011 and the 
works cited there). However, the results also indicate that analyzing exogenous demand-pull instruments 
without taking endogenous mechanisms into account tends to overestimate the impact of RE policies. The 
estimated impact of RE policies on innovation is higher when the variable is analyzed as a stand-alone 
driver of innovation than when it is combined with other covariates (see columns [1] and [5] in Table 3). 
Essentially, when the dependent variable is regressed only on RE policies, some of the mediation effect of 
economic growth on innovation (more details on this are discussed below) is spuriously captured by 
demand-pull policies. The empirical results also lend support to a widely accepted proposition that R&D 
research complemented with deployment policies are very effective in inducing RE technologies 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; Johnstone et al., 2010; Zachmann et al., 2014). Both effects are 
individually significant with economically plausible signs (see column [5] in Tables 3 and 4). Together, 
R&D and deployment policies create a positive feedback cycle (Watanabe et al., 2000), where the 
resulting benefits give positive feedback to the policy cycle (IPCC 2011, p. 888). The rapid development 
of RE in Germany is a case in point (IPCC 2011).  
Hypothesis 3a and 3b consider the impact of public policy uncertainty. Our results reveal a 
negative impact of policy uncertainty (proxied here by policy variability,     ) on RE diffusion, lending 
support to Hypothesis 3b. This is consistent with the general perception that policy uncertainty poses a 
serious threat to the development of low-carbon technologies (IEA, 2007). Like businesses in other 
industries, those within the RE industry adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude in the face of uncertainty and delay 
                                                             
18 For example, Zachmann et al. (2014) found that the impact of R&D spending on wind technology seemed to be most effective 
between the second and sixth year. 
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their investments until policy direction becomes clearer (Stern, 2007). For example, Meyer and Koefoed 
(2003) looked at the impact of delayed implementation of the new policy in Demark and found that it 
caused a well-established wind industry to stall. Likewise, in the context of Canada and Norway, White et 
al. (2013) discuss how large, unexpected changes in public policies increased uncertainty, eventually 
leading to a fall in investments in RE sector. In 2013 installation of solar panels fell by nearly 60% in 
Germany and by 70% in Italy following a decision by the European Commission to phase out subsidies 
for RE by 2017 (Creyts and Stuchtey, 2015). In its latest report, the IEA (2013) warned that growth of RE 
in OECD markets is under threat due to ongoing uncertainty over policy framework in the EU and the 
US. The cloud of policy uncertainty is particularly damaging at a time when renewables are becoming a 
cost-competitive option in the global energy market. Conversely, results do not support hypothesis 3a as 
the impact of public policy uncertainty on RE innovation is not statistically significant and positive (see 
model [5] in Table 3). Interestingly, policy uncertainty seems to affect only decisions pertaining to the 
deployment of commercially available technologies (i.e. those affecting RE diffusion), but not much to 
the innovation creation process. Indirectly, these findings reinforce the view that demand-pull policies 
favor the exploitation of those technologies closest to grid parity, but are relatively ineffective at 
producing technological breakthroughs (of course, the other facet of this coin is that the innovation 
process is more resilient to short-term policy variability). This apparently counter-intuitive result is 
consistent with recent contributions suggesting that companies may carry on with their innovation efforts, 
even in face of high regulatory uncertainty, if they need to secure scarce resources, leverage 
complementary assets, or alleviate institutional pressure (Hoffman et al., 2009). 
The last set of hypotheses, from 4a to 5b, discusses the impact of endogenous drivers on RE 
innovation and RE diffusion. In the diffusion model, the estimated coefficients for income and income 
squared are, respectively, negative and positive, and statistically significant, validating our hypothesis that 
the relationship between RE diffusion and income is U-shaped. According to this result, up to a certain 
income threshold, the contribution of RE to a country’s total electricity generation is nil. However, once 
the threshold income level is crossed, driven by increased environmental awareness and greater affluence, 
the diffusion of RE sources increases. More concretely, after a certain threshold a 1% increase in real 
GDP per person (or about $340 per head) leads to a nearly 18% increase in RES’s contribution to 
electricity generation. A specific example may be illustrative here. Using the estimates of income and 
income squared in the RE diffusion model, the turning point income threshold is estimated at $34,391.
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Our sample has an average per person income of $33,990, which is close to the turning point income 
threshold. Over the period 1990-2012, per capita real GDP in EU15 countries grew at an average annual 
                                                             
19
 The turning point is obtained using the following formula:                , where    and    are the estimates income and 
income squared in column [5] in Table 4. 
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rate of 1.42%; whereas the average annual contribution of RES to electricity generation in the EU15 
countries was about 19%. Our results, therefore, suggest that, in the future, a similar level of RE diffusion 
could be maintained with an even lower per capita income growth, since the observed income level is 
close to the turning point income threshold (i.e. from that point onwards, the diffusion of RE will increase 
faster than any increase in the income level).
20
  
Conversely, results of the innovation model do not provide support to hypothesis 4a. The number 
of patents in the RE industry seem to be unrelated to economic growth. Taken together, our results shed 
new light on the critical role that endogenous demand-pull mechanisms play in supporting technological 
change and the diffusion of RE sources. Above a certain income level, greater environmental awareness 
does produce a demand for more renewable energies. However, alike to what observed for exogenous 
demand-pull policies, such demand does not stimulate the exploration of new technologies and tends to be 
satisfied through commercially available system (i.e. it supports exploitation rather than exploration). 
Finally, the results of the mediation model on innovation diffusion indicate that the total effect is 
estimated at 1.64, of which the estimate of the direct effect      is equal to 1.64 (i.e. nearly 80% of the 
total effect). This suggests that only 20% of the effect of economic growth on RE diffusion is transmitted 
through RE policies (the mediating variable). To investigate this finding further, we also test for the 
possibility of reverse causality running from RE share to GDP growth, as documented in Marques and 
Fuinhas (2012). Based on Granger causality test, we find that for 11 out of 15 countries RE share does not 
cause GDP growth, indicating that reverse causality is an unlikely confound behind our results. These 
results, along with the evidence already reported, strongly support our hypothesis regarding the role of 
economic growth as an endogenous demand-pull driver of RE diffusion. The results of the mediation 
model on RE patents are insignificant and are not reported here. 
   
7. Conclusions 
This paper aims to study the mechanisms that support innovation creation and diffusion in the renewable 
energy sector. We applied panel data models to estimate the impact of public R&D investments, RE 
support policies and per capita income on RE patents (a measure of innovation creation) and RE share (a 
measure of innovation diffusion) in 15 EU countries from 1990 to 2012. By focusing on both exploration 
and exploitation mechanisms and on endogenous and exogenous drivers of innovation, our study sheds 
                                                             
20 These results clearly nest the prediction of the prosperity or affluence hypothesis of Baumol and Oates (1979), which assumes 
that the demand for the quality of the environment rises with income, an argument typically advanced in environmental 
economics (e.g. Field 1994). In addition, these results have important implications for the debate over economic growth versus 
environmental quality. For instance, in the standard neoclassical environment growth model (e.g. Nordhaus, 1994), higher 
environmental quality is achieved through reducing capital accumulation, which, in turn, reduces GDP and economic growth. 
However, recent growth models with endogenous and directed technical change have shown that environmental goals can be 
achieved with simple environmental policies such as research subsidies and “without sacrificing (much or any) long-run growth” 
(Acemoglu et al., 2012, p. 133). 
24 
 
new light on the long discussed technology-push vs. demand-pull debate and it contributes to the 
literature on RE policy assessment.  
We argue that in addition to the traditional push-pull dichotomy, the drivers of technological 
change must be differentiated based on whether they are exogenous or endogenous to the economic 
system. Building on that observation, we propose a taxonomy of support mechanisms and we maintain 
that a specific type of endogenous demand-pull mechanism (i.e. economic growth) is an important and 
much underrated driver of innovation diffusion (but not creation), with both a direct and an indirect 
impact. We further suggest innovation support mechanisms have to be assessed with respect to whether 
they facilitate the creation or the diffusion of innovations.  
Our results provide further empirical support to the idea that innovation policies should be 
carefully balanced. Among the various drivers examined, exogenous technology-push measures have a 
stronger impact on innovation creation than diffusion; although, while their effect on innovation creation 
is almost immediate, their impact on diffusion becomes visible only after significant time lag. Exogenous 
demand-pull policies also have a stronger positive impact on innovation creation than diffusion; although, 
their contribution becomes less important after controlling for economic growth. The variability of 
support mechanisms also has a negative impact on innovation diffusion but not on innovation creation 
(i.e. it hurts exploitation but not exploration). 
Most importantly, our results show that economic growth is a much stronger driver of innovation 
diffusion than either technology-push or exogenous policy-driven demand-pull mechanisms, whereas it is 
relatively ineffective at stimulating innovation creation. The effect of endogenous growth on RE diffusion 
is both direct and indirect (through its impact on RE policies) although the direct effect is largely 
predominant. Thus, the relationship between economic growth and RE diffusion exhibits a nonlinear, U-
shaped pattern. At low levels of economic growth, investments are allocated to the least expensive (but 
least environmentally friendly) technologies. After income per capita has reached a given threshold, the 
demand for environmental quality rises and investments are eventually redirected to less polluting, but 
more expensive technologies. However, the demand for better environmental quality is satisfied through 
the exploitation of commercially available technologies and it does not produce any significant effect on 
the exploration of new technologies.  
In passing, the paper also makes some methodological contributions. We note that both the 
direction and the magnitude of the estimated impacts are dependent on the choice of the correct panel data 
estimator, which must take into account the presence of both cross-sectional dependence (CSD) and 
nonstationarity in the panel data.  
Our results have a number of policy implications. First, they reinforce the view that different 
innovation support instruments should be deployed together. The EKC hypothesis suggests that for RE 
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diffusion to increase, government action should be directed at stimulating aggregated demand and 
economic growth rather than at shielding renewables from competition with fossil fuel technologies. 
However, such efforts should be coupled with innovation technology-push policies that stimulate radical 
innovation, because the latter is not induced by economic growth. Furthermore, our findings that RE 
companies may carry on with their innovation efforts despite high levels of regulator uncertainty should 
not imply overconfidence and complacency when designing RE policies. In particular, policy makers 
must be wary of unintended consequences of regulatory uncertainty, which could lead to a bifurcation in 
manufacturing in the sense that firms may find it profitable to produce PV cells (a higher-value 
manufacturing activity) in China and assemble them (a lower-value, lower-technology manufacturing 
activity)  in, say, Germany
21
. Finally, our methodological findings also have important implications. The 
finding that renewable energy contains a unit root implies that policies designed to induce permanent 
changes in RE such as FITs or TGCs will be more effective than policies such as tax incentives designed 
to induce temporary changes.  
Our study is not exempt from some limitations, although these indicate avenues for future 
research. First, while we used quantitative measures for assessing the level of exogenous technology-push 
mechanisms (public R&D spending) and endogenous demand-pull mechanisms (GDP per capita), we 
could only use qualitative indicators for measuring exogenous demand-pull instruments (RE deployment 
policies). Our approach is fully consistent with the extant empirical literature in the field. However, it 
would be interesting to replicate the analysis after obtaining detailed quantitative data on the budgets 
allocated to RE support policies by each of the countries in our sample. Second, although our results are 
robust to different assumptions and different test specifications, the analysis was conducted on a relatively 
small sample that only included EU countries. Compared to some emerging economies, the countries in 
our sample have a higher awareness of environmental problems and a higher willingness to pay for 
tackling them. This may have amplified the impact of endogenous demand-pull mechanisms we observed. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. A taxonomy of studies on innovation support mechanisms for RE or environmental technologies 
 
  Outcome of the innovation process 
Type of support Locus of support Innovation creation (patents) Innovation diffusion (deployment) 
Technology push 
Exogenous Peters et al. (2012) 
Costantini et al. (2015) 
Hoppman et al. (2013) 
Nemet (2009) 
Watanabe et al. (2000) 
Klaassen et al. (2005) 
 
Polzin et al. (2015) 
Hoffman (2009) 
Hoppman et al. (2013) 
Jager-Waldau (2007) 
Watanabe et al. (2000) 
Klaassen et al. (2005) 
 
Endogenous N.A. N.A. 
Demand pull 
Exogenous Peters et al. (2012) 
Costantini et al. (2015) 
Corradini et al. (2014)  
Hoppman et al. (2013) 
Hoppman et al. (2014) 
Nemet (2009)  
Soderholm and Klaassen (2007) 
Polzin et al. (2015) 
White et al. (2012) 
Hoffman et al. (2009) 
Borghesi et al. (2015)  
Hoppman et al. (2013) 
Hoppman et al. (2014) 
Jager-Waldau (2007) 
Fouquet and Johansson (2008) 
Soderholm and Klaassen (2007) 
Endogenous (EKC) N.A. Mazzanti and Musolesi (2013) (indirectly, through 
impact on emissions) 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Patent counts in the 
renewable industry 
Share of RE in electricity 
production (%) 
GDP per person 
($2005 constant prices) 
Share of RE RD&D in 
total  share 
REP index 
           
Austria 14 13.92 0.05 0.03 $34,478 4131.85 0.87 0.08 6 5.83 
Belgium 10 11.03 0.02 0.03 $33,313 3349.07 0.61 0.20 18.52 12.55 
Denmark 53 74.51 0.17 0.13 $43,757 4133.07 0.86 0.11 11.34 4.98 
Finland 6 7.02 0.12 0.02 $32,975 5382.05 0.65 0.17 7.43 4.73 
France 39 48.44 0.01 0.01 $31,689 2561.53 0.24 0.14 18.21 16.14 
Germany 206 207.08 0.05 0.06 $32,615 2885.88 0.84 0.10 17.30 7.24 
Greece 2 1.59 0.02 0.02 $18,713 2864.42 0.79 0.14 9.73 4.50 
Ireland 4 6.04 0.04 0.05 $36,709 11522.27 0.88 0.12 8.34 8.08 
Italy 27 33.58 0.04 0.04 $28,710 1816.59 0.84 0.17 16.95 14.47 
Luxembourg 1 1.01 0.05 0.03 $69,966 11757.77 0.99 - 7.43 4.29 
Netherlands 24 24.77 0.05 0.04 $36,385 4431.14 0.73 0.10 7.34 6.19 
Portugal 2 2.73 0.09 0.08 $16,940 1764.31 0.73 0.16 5.04 5.38 
Spain 27 36.25 0.06 0.07 $23,281 2931.49 0.84 0.08 6.39 9.07 
Sweden 11 11.84 0.05 0.04 $36,684 5371.15 0.94 0.06 14.39 10.59 
UK 41 41.87 0.03 0.03 $33,631 5047.23 0.64 0.16 20.30 22.40 
EU-15 
(1990–2012) 
31 77.65 0.05 0.06 $33,990 12988 0.75 0.21 11.65 11.45 
EU-15 
(2000–2012) 
52 100 0.08 0.07 $37,521 13909 0.80 0.18 19.01 11.03 
The sample period is 1990–2012. Average patent counts are rounded to the nearest whole number. Renewable sources do not include hydro power. See the text for details.  Source: 
World Energy Balance, IEA (2013). 
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Table 3. Negative binomial panel regression with fixed effects for RE innovation 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
REP index 
 
REP 
 
R&D 
 
GDP 
 
GDP
2
 
 
Trend 
 
Log-likelihood 
Observations 
0.077
***
 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-972.53 
330 
0.076
***
  
(0.003) 
-0.0005 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-937.69 
315 
0.070
***
 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.015) 
0.001
**
  
(0.0009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-840.02 
269 
0.057
***
  
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.002
***
  
(0.0008) 
-20.51 
(17.10) 
1.083
*
  
(0.832) 
 
 
-828.88 
269 
0.043
***
  
(0.006) 
0.005  
(0.014) 
0.002
***
  
(0.0008) 
-6.12  
(17.22) 
0.429  
(0.834) 
0.005
***
  
(0.001) 
-822.13 
269 
The dependent variable patent counts in the renewable industry. The REP index is a measure of 
RE policies; REP is a measure of policy uncertainty surrounding renewable support policies; 
RE R&D is the log share of renewable R&D spending; GDP and GDP2 are log of real GDP per 
person and squared counterpart; Trend is a linear time trend. Constant terms were included but 
not reported. The values in parentheses are standard errors. All models are estimated by fixed 
effects negative binominal panel data models. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed test). 
 
 
Table 4. Common correlated effect mean group (CCEMG) panel regression for RE diffusion 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
REP index 
 
REP 
 
R&D(t-5) 
 
GDP 
 
GDP
2
 
 
Trend 
 
RMSE 
Observations 
0.003 
(0.015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.245 
345 
0.003 
(0.016) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.211 
330 
0.035
*
  
(0.027) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.156 
(0.234) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
215 
0.032
**
  
(0.019) 
-0.014
**
  
(0.007) 
0.069  
(0.165) 
-411.44
*
  
(313.13) 
19.44
*
  
(15.00) 
 
 
0.051 
195 
0.023
*
  
(0.015) 
-0.012
*
  
(0.007) 
0.219
*
  
(0.154) 
-378.04
*
  
(257.37) 
18.09
*
  
(12.42) 
0.020 
(0.056) 
0.046 
195 
The dependent variable is log RE share. The REP index is a measure of RE policies; REP 
is a measure of policy uncertainty surrounding renewable support policies; RE R&D is the 
log share of renewable R&D spending; GDP and GDP2 are log of real GDP per person 
and squared counterpart; Trend is a linear time trend. Constant terms were included but 
not reported. The values in parentheses are standard errors. All models are estimated by 
fixed effects negative binominal panel data models. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (one-tailed test). 
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Figure 1. A taxonomy of RE support instruments 
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Figure 2. Plots of economic variables 
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Figure 3. The renewable energy-income matrix 
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Figure 4. Box plots of economic variables 
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Appendices 
 
This Appendix is divided into three parts. In the first part, we summarize the various panel data tests that 
are used as a pretest to select the appropriate econometric method to estimate the RE diffusion model. It 
also reports the findings of the various panel tests. In the second part, we briefly describe the econometric 
methods, namely the negative binomial regression for the RE innovation model, and the common 
correlated effect mean group (CCEMG) estimator for the RE diffusion model. The third part discusses the 
results of various robustness tests of our baseline results presented in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Appendix A: Panel Data Tests and Results 
 
A.1 Cross-sectional dependence (CSD) tests 
It has now become customary to test for the presence of CSD in panel data models because the individual 
units in the panel (countries, in our case) are likely to exhibit strong correlations due to their exposure to 
common macroeconomic, technological, legal/institutional, political, environmental, health and 
sociological shocks. Our panel data comprising the EU-15 countries are expected to be affected by similar 
shocks, albeit in different magnitude, making the panel highly prone to CSD. For example, one may 
expect, a priori, a high level of CSD in RE deployment due to the implementation of common RE 
policies across the EU (i.e. the EU directive). Likewise, the increased business cycle correlation across 
the EU economies makes the case for CSD more compelling. As such, neglecting CSD could lead to 
significant size distortions in the panel unit root and cointegration tests that assume cross-sectional 
independence (Baltagi and Pesaran 2007). To this end, we use the test of error cross-dependence (the CD 
test) developed by Pesaran (2004). The CD test statistic is based on the average of the pairwise Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients      of the residual obtained from the panel data model and it is given by:  
    
  
      
       
 
     
   
       
(A1) 
under the null hypothesis of no CSD (i.e.                                  ). The test has a mean 
exactly at zero for fixed values of T and N under a wide range of panel data models, including 
nonstationary models. In addition, we also make use of the tests proposed by Friedman (1937) and Frees 
(1995). The Friedman (1937) test is based on the average Spearman’s correlation and is given by: 
     
 
      
      
 
     
   
      
(A2) 
where      is the simple estimate of the rank correlation coefficient of the residuals. In comparison, the 
Frees (1995) test is based on the sum of the squared rank correlation coefficients and equals: 
    
  
 
      
      
  
     
   
    . 
(A3) 
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Unlike the    and      tests, the     
  test is robust to the alternating sign of the correlation. 
 
A.2 Panel unit root test 
The panel unit root test considered in our application is the test proposed by Pesaran (2007), which 
follows the correlated common effects (CCE) approach and filters out the CSD by augmenting the ADF 
regressions with cross-section averages. The cross-section augmented ADF (CADF) regressions, carried 
out separately for each country, are given by: 
                                 
 
             
 
               (A4) 
where    denotes the cross-section mean of    . The CIPS statistic is a simple-cross section average of     
defined by: 
             
 
     (A5) 
where     is the ordinary least squares t-ratio of    in the CADF regression above. 
 
A.3 Panel cointegration test(s) 
Following Holly et al. (2010), we adopt a two-stage procedure to assess the possibility of cointegration 
between log of contribution of the renewable share and its determinants as shown in equation (2). In both 
stages, the procedure allows for unobserved common factors that could be potentially correlated with the 
observed regressors. Using the CCE estimator, we first estimate Equation (2) and obtain the residuals. We 
then apply the CIPS panel unit root test discussed above to these residuals: 
                                     (A6) 
If the presence of a unit root in    ’s can be rejected, we can conclude that the variables are cointegrated. 
 
A.4 Results of Cross-sectional dependence tests 
We apply three alternative tests to examine the extent of CSD in our panel data. All three tests test the 
null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence against the alternative hypothesis of CSD. The CD test 
statistic of Pesaran (2004) is 15.94 with a p-value of 0.00, which clearly rejects the null hypothesis of 
cross-sectional independence in the panel. The results for Friedman’s (1937)      test also yield a similar 
conclusion: the test statistic 103.76 (p = 0.00), suggesting that strong CSD is present in the data. 
However, both the CD and      tests share a common weakness in that they miss out cases of CSD 
where correlations sign alternates (De Hoyos and Sarafidis 2006). The test statistic      
   of Frees 
(1995) is, however, not subject to this drawback. The     
  test statistic is 3.29 (p = 0.00), which also 
rejects the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. Moreover, the average absolute value of the 
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off-diagonal elements of the cross-sectional correlation matrix of the residual is 0.47, which is very high. 
Overall, the results indicate that there is enough evidence to suggest the presence of CSD in the data. 
 
A.5 Results of the panel unit root test Given the strong presence of CSD in the data, we have employed 
the CIPS panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007), which allows for CSD. The CIPS statistic is based on the 
cross-section average of the individual ADF t-statistics of each unit in the panel. Under the null 
hypothesis, the CIPS assumes that a series is nonstationary. Given the short length of the individual units 
(T=23), we consider a maximum of two lags and allow both constant and deterministic trends in the test 
regression. For the dependent variable (RE share),  the results of the CIPS test statistic with lags p=1 and 
2 are -1.75 and -1.37 (intercept only) and -1.74 and -1.24 (with intercept and trend). At the 5% 
significance level, the critical values of the CIPS statistic for N=20 and T in the range of 20–30 are about 
-2.25 and -2.76 with a constant and constant and trend, respectively. Therefore, according to the CIPS 
statistic, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% level. 
Likewise, for the log of real GDP per capita, the CIPS test statistics are -1.83 and -1.92 (intercept) 
and -2.32 and -2.36 (intercept and trend) for lag lengths of 1 and 2, respectively. These test statistics are 
lower than the 5% critical values reported just above, suggesting that the series is nonstationary. Note that 
nonstationarity in the log of GDP per capita implies that its quadratic form (i.e. the square of the log of 
GDP per capita) is also nonstationary.
22
 Park and Phillips (1999) have shown that the usual I(1) 
asymptotics hold for regressions with a nonlinear transformation (such as power) of the time series. 
However, we could not test for the presence of a unit root in the log of R&D spending, as some 
observations were missing. Nonetheless, the plots of R&D spending (see Figure 2(c) in the text) indicate 
that the series are trending upwards over time, leading us to conclude that a unit root might be present in 
the R&D spending data. 
Given the presence of stochastic trends in the data, a practical implication for inference is that the 
least squares estimation of the model in Equation (1) cannot reliably distinguish between a true long-run 
relationship and a spurious regression (Granger and Newbold 1974). A panel time series estimator can 
address this concern over spurious regression, as discussed below. Another implication is that 
nonstationarity in time series poses a serious problem for forecasting the future path of the contribution of 
RE in the energy mix as a function of income, as current shocks have permanent effects on their levels. 
For a further discussion, see Basher et al. (2015).  
Our next task is to test for the existence of the long-run equilibrium relationships of Equation (1) 
for the panel as a whole. 
                                                             
22 Since   is I(1),   
           
      
    
         . Since    is orthogonal to   , this implies that   
  is also I(1). We 
thank Stefano Fachin for pointing this out to us.  
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A.6 Results of the panel cointegration test Finally, we apply the CIPS(p) panel unit root test described 
above to the estimated residuals as shown in Equation (A6), including an intercept and with lag orders 
p=1,2, and 3. We obtained the results -3.617, -2.687, and -2.30, respectively. These test statistics exceed 
the 5% critical value (around -2.25) of the CIPS statistic for the intercept case and for panel dimensions 
similar to ours. The results suggest rejection of a unit root in the residuals of Equation (A6), indicating 
that the variables in question are indeed cointegrated.  
 
Appendix B: Panel Data Estimators 
 
B.1 Negative binomial regression 
As the dependent variable     have a Poisson distribution with parameter    , which in turn depends on a 
vector of exogenous variables    , the fixed-effects Poisson regression model for panel data is given as 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1998): 
                  (B1) 
where    is the fixed effects. 
 One way to estimate the above model is by means of conventional Poisson regression using 
maximum likelihood. However, the Poisson model is known to suffer from overdispersion problem and 
an excess in zeros. Efficient estimation of overdispersed model can be achieved by assuming that     have 
a negative binomial distribution, which generalizes Poisson regression by accounting for cross-sectional 
heterogeneity. The negative binominal model of Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984) is given as: 
              
          
              
 
  
    
 
   
      
     
(B2) 
where   is the gamma function,    is assumed to be constant over time for each individual and     is 
defined as: 
           (B3) 
The mean and variance of     are given by              and                     . Therefore, the 
variance to mean ratio is       . Thus, the negative binomial model allows for overdispersion with the 
original Poisson a limiting case as    .   
 
B.2 CCEMG estimator 
The results of the above panel tests suggest that we cannot exclude the presence of either CSD or 
cointegration in our data. Thus, to estimate equation (1), we used the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) 
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estimator of Pesaran (2006), which is robust to the presence of CSD and can handle cointegrated 
relationships. 
Besides CSD, there are other forms of interaction among variables that are either unobservable or 
difficult to measure. Pesaran (2006) solved this problem by augmenting equation (1) with the cross-
section averages of the independent and dependent variables: 
                                        (B4) 
where    are the individual specific loading coefficients of the cross-sectional averages of all observable 
variables in the model. The     coefficient estimates the effect of income on RE’s contribution after 
controlling for common factors in the data. The dynamics and common unobserved factors are modeled in 
the error terms    , which are assumed to have the following structure: 
      
         (B5) 
where    is an    vector of unobserved common effects and     represents the country-specific 
(idiosyncratic) errors that are assumed to be distributed independently of the regressors     and   . 
However,     is allowed to be weakly dependent across i. The CCE estimator is based on the assumption 
that     is generated as: 
         
       , (B6) 
where    is a     vector of individual effects,    is a    factor of loading matrices with fixed 
components and     represents the specific components of     distributed independently of the common 
effects and across i. The CCE estimator is equivalent to ordinary least squares technique applied to an 
auxiliary regression such as Equation (2). The CCE mean group (CCEMG) estimator, which has been 
adopted in our application, is a simple average of the individual CCE estimators,   : 
        
 
 
    
 
   .  
(B7) 
As pointed out by Eberhardt and Teal (2013), the CEE estimator is robust when the cross-section 
dimension N is small; when variables are nonstationary (cointegrated or not), subject to structural breaks; 
and/or in the presence of “weak” unobserved common factors (spatial spillover) and global/local business 
cycles. 
 
Appendix C: Robustness tests 
Our analysis stood up to a good number of robustness experiments, including alternative specifications or 
estimation techniques. Note that these sensitivity analyses were conducted for the RE diffusion model 
only. The first sensitivity analysis was conducted by adding hydropower to the contribution of RE. An 
interesting result that emerged was that across countries, hydro RE was more variable than nonhydro RE. 
This challenges the commonly held view that only wind and solar energy are variable;, hydro power can 
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be subject to even greater fluctuations of energy supply (e.g. drought or rainfall variability). For brevity, 
the estimation is conducted on the full specification by applying the CCEMG estimator (i.e. column [5] in 
Table 4). The time series properties (unit root, cointegration) of hydro RES are almost identical to those 
of nonhydro RE. This suggests a long-run equilibrium relationship between the log of RE share and its 
determinants. The estimated parameters of the variables have the correct sign (as in the baseline CCEMG 
case in Table 2) but not statistically significant. Thus, our results are robust to the inclusion of hydro 
power in the data, although better results (in statistical terms) are obtained using the nonhydro RE.
23
  
Second, we also consider cumulative nonhydro RE capacity (as a percentage of total capacity) as 
an alternative dependent variable. As pointed out by Jenner et al. (2013), the choice of cumulative 
capacity is appropriate if the objective is to examine links between FIT policies and the decision to invest 
in solar or wind capacity. This is because, unlike generation or supply, cumulative capacity reflects 
expected (not actual) returns on investment. The estimation results are almost similar to those of the 
original model. Except for RE R&D share, which shows a negative sign, all other variables have the 
correct sign. But, once again, the estimates are not statistically significantly different from zero. Thus our 
results also survive the choice of RES capacity as an alternative dependent variable in the model. 
Third, we conducted an experiment allowing first and second lags of the REP index separately in 
the regression model, since there might be a time lag between the implementation of RE policies and the 
resulting diffusion of RE sources. However, these changes did not improve the results relative to the 
baseline findings reported in Table 2. The estimated lag coefficients are negative but insignificant, 
whereas the coefficients of income and income retained their expected signs, losing some significance. 
Finally, we augmented equation (1) with an interaction term between our RE policy variable and GDP per 
capita to see how these two variables work together in explaining the variation in RE. In this case, the 
estimated coefficients for RE policy are negative and that for GDP is positive. However, the coefficient of 
the interaction term has a positive sign, implying that an additional increase in GDP per capita yields a 
higher increase in RE. This supports the notion that in a market economy, demand-pull approaches 
encourage firms to generate clean energy through market signals and creating incentives. Finally, we have 
also considered the pooled version of the CCE estimator of Pesaran (2006) in order to gain efficiency in 
the parameter estimates by restricting the individual slope coefficients    to be the same across the cross-
section units. However, the results are once again no better than those of the CCEMG estimator reported 
in column [5] of Table 4. These results are not discussed here to conserve space. 
 
                                                             
23 These unreported results are available from the corresponding author on request. 
